
Civilization and Cultural Identity in Postmodernity

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In our present-day communication society, expanded by the project of a planetary civilization, encounters and intersections between very different cultures cannot be avoided. So in the philosophical sphere the discussion on the category “alien” has become inescapably ever more frequent. A mere phenomenological approach to the cultures, and also to our own culture, is no longer sufficient for this purpose, precisely because the alien is radically alien and shows itself only indirectly. Or, more precisely, because it shows itself in such a manner that at the same time it always also withdraws itself. Hence philosophy must here become hermeneutics. For even in the native culture every change, every movement of freedom, every creative activity is stirred up by the core of radical alienness and unfamiliarity. Hence interpretation taking place in the course of cultural dialogue can also be a productive stimulus.

The concept of freedom, so decisive in Latin American thought, has been construed in Argentina on the one hand in a Marxist direction (Dussel) and on the other hand in the context of a hermeneutics of culture (Scannone and his followers).

My interest in the current problems of philosophy of culture is associated with the second orientation. Latin American philosophy was concerned in the seventies with an elucidation of the so-called cultural identity. In this respect, three categories were especially elaborated: “culture,” “the people” and “the wisdom of the people.” In the meantime the three categories, considered as a whole, have become problematic. Both planetarization and Postmodernism in the last decades move in another direction. “Planetary civilization” expands itself instead of “culture,” “massive” or even “cybernetic society” in place of “the people,” and “public opinion” rather than “the wisdom of the people.”

But another alternative appears in outline at the horizon. The intercultural dialogue may lead perhaps to a universal community as an association of peoples,

to a more plentiful and spiritual wisdom with responsibility for the future generations.

In the following considerations I intend to analyze the three cases and their current transformations.

1. Culture, planetary civilization and intercultural dialogue

1.1. *On the concept of “culture”*

“Culture” as a category of modernity has been invalidated. Nevertheless, instead of simply burying it, one can attempt to overcome it in a Heideggerian manner, that is to say, maintaining first of all the upper hand over the essence of culture. Maintaining the upper hand over (*Verwindung*) can also be understood in the sense of a recovery from illness.

The Spanish language sets us on the path to the essence of culture. Culture manifests itself as a structural threefold dimension: firstly, as cultivation (*cultivo*); secondly, as cult (*culto*); and finally, as education (*educación*). The three dimensions implied conduct themselves one with another as elements of a whole in which the modification of an element produces changes in the others. Culture requires the transition from violence to concern in view of the four equally essential bonds of man with nature, with the Holy, with himself and with the other men. Such a transition is only possible in a true sense as a movement of existential liberation and simultaneous transformation of the world.

By freedom we understand more a vocation and a task than a factum. With Kierkegaard it can be acknowledged as a “passion for possibility.” And possibility (*posibilidad*) can be etimologically traced back to “be able to” (*poder*) and “be capable of.” So true possibilities, not just dreamed possibilities, are concerned with

the power of being-able-to and being-capable-of. Basically it is a matter of being-able-to-be (*Seinkönnen*), which admits a fourfold configuration, that is, being-able-to-labour, being-able-to-speak, being-able-to-wish (-desire) and being-able-to-love. With freedom, the self shapes itself and the world is in a way transformed. This self (*autós*) is involved in different epochal names of freedom, as in the Greek autarky and the modern autonomy.

In the following we will characterize each of the three dimensions of culture according to four indicators: first, the connection or relation which is decisive in the particular case; secondly, the corresponding figure of freedom; thirdly, the perspective of the world which is thereby opened; and fourthly, the mediation which is thereto necessary.¹

1.1.1. *Culture as cultivation produces a world as work*

In culture as cultivation, the force and craftiness of man unfolds itself against the violence of nature, and an effort is made to attain a freer bond between man and nature. Human freedom as being-able-to-be is achieved here in being-able-to-labour thanks to the mediation of technicity. In this manner the world also emerges as an architectonic of works.

Different modes of labour brought about considerable changes in the primitive unfamiliarity with nature and led both to the abandonment of caverns with the associated fears and to the transition to the building of houses and villages. As contradistinguished to nature, labour introduces a difference. It lays claim to a deferment or postponement (*diferir*) of the closure of the tragic circle, that is, that all that is born out of nature as a mother at once enters upon a return journey to nature as a grave.

We agree with the short Hegelian characterization of labour: "Labour, on the other hand, is hindered desire, fleetingness held in check; in other words, it forms."² The hindrance of desire negates and sublates the mere animal necessity and opens up the space of time for human action with its capacities for transformation. In this manner a twofold result is achieved: on the one hand, the ritual of natural fleetingness is conjured away to give occasion to the greater persistence of the work (which by means of *hybris* can be exaggerated to a monumental ambition), and on the other hand the labourer in person fashions himself with the result that he gains a universal self-consciousness.

In any case technicity is the mediation in this relationship holding between man and nature. Technicity goes through transformations, which correspond to its timely commitment (*Schicksal*). So its history develops out of tool-technics through machine-technics to the present-day electronic-technics. There ensues also a reevaluation in the means-ends logic. Means are considered as compulsory and universal (globalizing), as the "genuine language," whereas ends sink into the vanishing and particular and are called forth by the means.³

1.1.2. *Culture as cult interprets the world as text*

The presence of ritual violence is the symptom of an unrighteous relation between man and God. Cult attempts to rise above this violence and find freer configurations. By means of consecration-gestures it differentiates between the favourable and holy space and the wild space, between the "great time" of creation and the profane time of everyday occurrence. Thus, *templum* and festivity emerge.

Freedom appears here in the shape of being-able-to-speak, which implies an unremitting sense-bestowing and sense-interpretation as well as valuation. This responds to the human need to understand the world. The highest value which can be reached by a culture is felt in it as holy. The articulateness (*Gefüge*) of those means and values that determine our orientation and veneration has been called the world as text. Text is derived etymologically from the Indoeuropean "*teks, tek*," which means so much as "woven fabrics, articulateness, architectonic." The symbolic instance articulates existence and world so that the relation gains in familiarity (*Heimlichkeit*). We take the word "text" in a very wide sense understanding by it both the choreography of the consecration gestures and dance and the solid grammar of documents. Here belong also gestures, oral or written language, the sequence of images on a cloth and the image-screen. Different discourses have taken upon themselves the task of world-interpretation and arranged it in greater or lesser degree in a system. Among them are myth and religion, art, philosophy and science. Particularly important has been history, whose discourse is so essential for the constitution of what following Ricoeur has been called "narrative identity."⁴

Undoubtedly language is in this dimension the most genuine mediation. As Hegel says:

The forms of thought are first of all put out and laid down in the language of man. In our days attention can still not be sufficiently drawn to the fact that it is by thought that man differentiates itself

from an animal. Language has forced its way into all that becomes for him something inner, a representation of whatever sort, into all that he shapes into his own; and all that he brings to language and utters into it contains a category, whether concealed, intermingled or worked out. To that extent logic is for him something natural, or rather it is his peculiar *nature* itself. But if nature as such, as the physical, is opposed to the spiritual, it should be then said that logic is rather the supernatural, which forces its way into all the natural behaviour of man, into his sensation, intuitions, desires, needs, impulses, and thereby shapes it as a whole into something human, even if only formally, into representations and ends.⁵

Logic as a symbiosis of rationality and reality is at home in language. The articulations of language are in turn also articulations of thought. This correspondence was experienced by the Greek by means of the key-word “*lógos*.”

1.1.3. *Culture as education and its grounding in the world as community*

The bonds which are now threatened by violence are the relations of man with himself and the relation of man with the other man. Culture as education renders possible the development of pathos into ethos by virtue of a twofold movement: the appropriation that constitutes the ego (as Freud says, “Where the *id* was, the ego must come to be”),⁶ at once with socialization, when it is understood that the truth of human desire lies in its being the “desire of another desire.”⁷ According to Freud, the capacity for culture shows itself in the possibility of transforming “egoistic desiring” into “social desires” by means of erotic forces.⁸

At this level, ethical and political praxis sets forth freedom as power-to-wish and power-to-love. Ultimately one freedom nourishes only on another freedom. It is almost impossible to be free in an unfree land. So was the *polis* also for Aristotle a space of this sort for the development of freedom. What is decisive is no longer the needs but rather the texture of autarky and friendship.

On the other hand, the task of formation (*Bildung*) is humanization. This can only occur in a world as a community. And this again is “the action of all and each,”⁹ and so its consummated formula is “‘I’ that is ‘we’ and ‘we’ that is ‘I’.”¹⁰ Strictly speaking, it is not possible to be a self-taught person, for by no means do we come alone to language, which is certainly the key to culture. Wolf-children, cases of marasmus, and even the death of children which suffer from hospitalization, can be mentioned as cases of failure in humanization.

Although we in no manner disregard the effort of discourse ethics with reference to rational consensus and its utopian pole, the counterfactual anticipation of the ideal communication community, we believe that it requires as a concomitant phenomenon a formation and culture of feeling (*Affektivität*). It would be very profitable to enter once more into a hermeneutic relationship with the outstanding historical models as, for example, the above mentioned friendship of the Greek *polis*, the Hebrew alliance, the universal Christian brotherhood, the *ayllu* of the Incas (that is to say, a community based on the exchange of gifts) or the *ejido* of the Aztecs. The highest-ranking bond, such as friendship or brotherhood, also guarantees justice, but the reverse is not true.

Finally, the specific mediation of this third cultural dimension must be here mentioned. It is the institution as social mediation.

1.2. *The planetary civilization and the peculiarity of cultures. Intercultural dialogue*

In the first part of our paper we have pointed out that there is no innocent language. In language we can recognize where our fundamental bonds are to be found as well as its oppression by a power that exerts violence, or its furtherance by the power of freedom (*poder* means also to be able to).

At the same time it should be observed that civilization claims to be one by virtue of its singularity, whereas cultures affirm their identity in the difference pertaining to plurality. In the presence of civilization there is always the threat that cultural pluralism will be suppressed.

Noticeable in language is also the violence with which the word “civilization” strove to smother the word “culture.” Just consider how long the word “culture” has been contested in the Anglo-Saxon sphere. Although Tylor, one of their most important anthropologists, so far back as 1871, considered “civilization” and “culture” as synonymous, and later gave preference to “culture,” the Oxford Dictionary resisted the inclusion of this word until 1931.¹¹ There is no doubt that anthropology must be thanked for having enabled respect to flow into our relation with the other and the alien. Just as the city exerted *hybris* against the countryside, so does civilization now conduct itself in the same way against cultures. Perhaps because cultures

always convey an ecological tone, “civilization” is reserved rather for high cultures, in which the construction of the (large) city has been decisive. Today, the city (*civitas*) has become global (Zbigniew Brzezinski) and the village has turned cosmic (Mc Luhan). Civilization can conceive itself only as planetary. According to Kostas Axelos’ analyses, the situation now calls for the reduction of everything to a plan, that is to say, to planning leading to a universal levelling.¹² This phenomenon is the uniformity with which, as stated by Heidegger, technicity as enframing (*Ge-stell*) enforces its domination.¹³

That is the reason why the threefold dimensionality of culture has sunk down into the unidimensionality of civilization. Civilization narrows language into univocal terms so that it becomes techno-logical. On the social and political level, it becomes techno-cratic. In turn, according to what has been stated, technocracy has in mind as a purpose a total “planocracy.”

The hegemony of a model and its will-onto-domination produces cultural penetration by means of the imperial language. In Alexander’s empire it was the Greek *koiné*. Later, Latin prevailed in the Roman Empire (and for years to come, up to our century, in the language of law and the Catholic Church). For a time French was the universal language of diplomacy, and today, finally, English is the official language of the most recent technological domination.

The conquest of the planet through development has won deserved prestige on account of its effectiveness and expansive force. Today a solution to the acute problems of hunger, illness and distance would be unthinkable without the successful outcomes of technology in the spheres of nourishment, health care and communication.

However, technological civilization as techno- and planocracy remains a hegemonic paradigm. Its will-onto-control conceals a will-onto-domination. The mask-parade is enacted through the “cultural industry” of the mass media, and this gives rise to new forms of alienation and mystification as well. However, the worst side of the hegemonic civilization is that it always secretes barbarianism. Men and cultures are to an increasing degree thrust out of it towards the margins (marginality).

Unfortunately, Rilke’s lamentations still are of immediate interest: “Sufferings are not acknowledged,/ love is not learnt,/ and what takes us away in death,/ is not unveiled.”¹⁴ Pain and suffering, love and death, have

their roots in the mystery of difference. On the other hand, anesthetization, deafening, the lack of meaning and misleading bonds are the forerunners of a worldwide in-difference.

Nevertheless, we do not wish to deny that concern with viability under such conditions is still maintained. But cultures bet on something higher: the furthermore of the desirability of life. On the basis of their network of bonds and their creative freedom they persist in the revaluation (transvaluation) and in the high costs of their projects of happiness. The most original project of happiness is a project of freedom.

The growth of freedom in cultures encourages the plurality of languages. The relationship between them is rather in accordance with the paradigm of translation, so that an intercultural dialogue can take place, and the concern with bond also turns into commitment. As a consequence, power is also decentralized in order to provide freedom, and so the creative resources of culture are set in motion. Actually, all kinds of centralization must be overcome: the individual egocentricity as well as the collective ethnocentricity, logocentricity, eurocentricity, in order to break the circle by which universality is found in oneness and oneness in universality. But this does not occur when provincialism or nationalism is merely transformed into exoticism or cosmopolitanism. Bernhard Waldenfels indicates that:

Even the endless dispute between universalists and culturalists, between advocates of a universal reason and a local reason, does not get off the path of appropriation. Whether we are concerned with a macrocentre or a multiplicity of microcentres, *centralization* is involved in all cases. Whether the comparability of forms of life and culture, or their incomparability, is stressed, in both cases it is a matter of comparing (*Vergleichen*), that is, of equalizing (*Gleichmachen*), which levels the difference between the own and the alien. However, if alienness is determined by its inaccessibility, the alien is not incomparable, which would still be a comparative quality, it rather withdraws from comparison, and is beyond all comparison.¹⁵

The adequate answer is to be found in respect for the claims of the radically alien. Nevertheless, attention to what Pietro Prini called “*compossibilitá*” is in no way excluded. The “*compossibilitá*” is a network, which emerges from the encounter of different and compatible possibilities.¹⁶ In this way the concrete universal is evoked, a universal in which differences are considered as an inexhaustible wealth that furthers intensive (tense) relations.

2. People and mass society. The wisdom of the people and public opinion

2.1. *The people, the modern civil society, the present-day mass society*

In the last decades, the concept of “the people” as creator of culture and as a life-community has been severely contested particularly because it has been identified with the modern nation-subject. Therefore there is no room for it in our transnational times. Although these categories should not be reduced in this way, their historical transformations must undoubtedly be taken seriously. “*Demos*”, “*Populus*”, “the people” relapse into an unavoidable entropy, which leads from the people through the modern civil society to the present-day mass society.

The concept of “the people” in Latin American thought has come under the influence of Max Scheler’s idea of “*ethos*” and Paul Ricoeur’s associated notion of an ethical-mythical core in the life of a people, and on the other hand of the Hegelian analysis of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*).

Only a brief reference to Scheler’s concept of “*ethos*” as “the variations in feeling (hence in ‘knowing’) the values themselves, as well as in the structure of value-preference and of love and hate. Let us characterize these variations as a whole as variations of ‘ethos’.”¹⁷ To ethos correspond the notions of world-outlook (*Weltanschauung*) in the intellectual sphere and living faith in the religious sphere. Also, according to Paul Ricoeur, values and practical habits (customs) constitute the essence of the people. Out of the ethical-mythical core, creative imagination and the memory of the people there emerge fundamental symbols, which render possible a decision for existence.

For Hegel, the first figure of ethical life is the substance and actuality of a people, a freedom which has become a world. To be a people is equivalent to having one’s ground and ultimate end in an ethical substance, set in motion and enlivened by the “doings of each and all.” It is associated with the universal rational will, which “is sensible of itself and actively disposed in the consciousness of the individual subject, whereas its practical operation and immediate universal actuality at the same time exist as custom.”¹⁸ In the people self-conscious freedom and trust set the tone of the mutual relations. According to Hegel, the life of such a people in the immediate ethical life is characterized by beauty

and happiness. In this regard, Hegel had in mind in his early thought the example of the pre-tragic Greeks. However, this description of the happy people is closer to paradigm than to reality.

On the other hand, freedom takes in the Modern age the figure of the autonomy of the individuals. The life-community becomes the civil society, which, in spite of the particular differentiation in diverse necessities and their respective satisfactions, the division of labour and the manifold interest, is still in accordance with an organic model. Its articulation is rendered possible by the estates, the corporations, and particularly the state as rational will and hence as interpreter of what society in truth wills.¹⁹ The loss of the organic character of the civil society lies in the breakdown of social mediation, and can be brought about by the weakening of the state or the confusion of classes and the historical irruption of the masses. It was the many, the majority as sheer aggregate or nexus, that disintegrated the society in atoms, which deserve no more the name of “*populus*,” but rather of “*vulgus*.” According to Hegel, the emergence of the “*vulgus*” or “*Pöbel*” is tied to economic and cultural impoverishment and to the loss of lawfulness and honour.²⁰

On the contrary, the present-day mass society harmonizes precisely as consumer society with abundance and prosperity, and even offers culture in the form of consumer goods. Mass democracy is asserted in the general elections, and the economy in the “opening of markets of great consumption.”²¹ With the indicated changes, the family also transforms itself. Its fate as a basic unit of society is no longer so clear, and its intimacy is threatened in several respects. It is released from its economic functions, the paternal authority is deconstructed, and its members are compelled to a premature socialization.²²

Finally, mass society becomes the “great public.” This requires adding spectacle to the economic, social and political transformations – a task which is assigned to the mass media. The electronic media which have shifted from writing to image and sound (radio, films and particularly television), and their communication channels, have brought about radical transformations in our experience of reality, time and space.

In regard to our interpretation of reality, we see with Nietzsche “how the world turns into fable.” In turn, Baudrillard has also attacked the “hyperralism of the apparent image (*simulacrum*).”²³ This means the pre-eminence of model over state of affairs, of image

over text, of process over product. Consider Vattimo's remarks:

Reality is for us rather the result of the intersecting one with another, of the contamination (*contamino* from *con-tango*: be in contact with) of multiple images, interpretations, reconstructions, which compete among themselves, and are disseminated by the media in any way and without 'central' coordination.²⁴

Consequently, according to Vattimo, the Post-modern society is conditioned by the mass media. It is not therefore more transparent, self-conscious and enlightened, but rather only a more complex and chaotic society. Nevertheless, for the same reason it is also pluralistic and a prelude to new freedom.

The experience of time has its ecstases, past and future, blended together with the present. The latter expands in excess with the help of satellite technology, so that at present simultaneousness holds sway.

The interpretation of space dismisses the scene and the mirror (spaces of the Modern age) and places itself within the image-screen and the network.

Cryptomyths and new rituals are introduced with such resources as condensation and series, and become the present-day sources of energy.

Finally, from a practical and hence ethical and political standpoint, the analogy between the concept of society and both organism and machine has been invalidated. The new paradigm is cybernetic and is construed as a "self-regulated system" (according to Lyotard). Political and democratic legitimation are substituted by technocrats and an "outfit which wants to be properly attended to" (according to Schelsky). Thus, instead of being a means to an expansive democratization of culture, mass media transform themselves into the instruments of a manipulation which has no precedents. Publicity and advertising have hitherto recognized only two aspects of identity within a society, that is, the masses of consumers and voters. Hence they are in principle promotion and propaganda.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that a particular cultural resistance, though not a very qualified one, is accomplished with melodrama (telenovela, *culebrón*) in television. Here spoken language – expression in words and dialogue – has pre-eminence over images insofar as living bonds are emphasized.

2.2. *How the wisdom of the people becomes public opinion*

Locke still assumed an essential connection between the wisdom of the people and opinion. Although it concerns individual consciousness and implicit consent, opinion is equally connected with folkway. It is the "indirect, social control," efficacious as "the formal censorship under threat of sanctions of the church and the state." But the first to use the expression "public opinion" was Rousseau in his *Discourse on Art and Science* (1750). Here public opinion is equated with "*bon sens*" and is sovereign. That is the reason why the constitution, which emerges out of the universal will, is anchored in the hearts and in the opinion of the people.²⁵

The hermeneutics of culture in Latin America also originates in the wisdom of the people. In this regard, Scannone writes: "When we speak of the wisdom of the people, we deal with the fundamental human universal wisdom insofar as it is inculcated by a concrete people in its symbols and attitudes."²⁶ The wisdom of the people develops out of the ethos of a culture, and is expressed in principle in symbols and rituals. For a surplus is acknowledged both in language and in action. Such a surplus constitutes the cultural core of gratuitousness and generosity, of creative power and solidarity. The ethical and political praxis of the liberation movements, which seek justice, dignity and bonds of love, also lives on it. Scannone goes on to say:

For all mankind as a universal 'we' is an original factum and at the same time sets up an ethical and historical task, that is, the task of bringing all peoples together to build up a great ethical-historical we, without loss, in doing so, of their particular ethical-historical and cultural identity. For the authentic communion of the 'we' presupposes respect for difference.

Now we must pursue how public opinion as such can emerge out of this original wisdom. That public opinion has its root in the wisdom of the people is, in spite of all forms of entropy, recognizable in the fact that present-day democracy also traces the source of its legitimation back to public opinion and the decision of the people.

Printing had favoured the development of the concepts and discourse of the Enlightenment. With Kant we can characterize the Enlightenment as the full age of reason and as freedom for the public use of one's own reason. The democratization of public opinion was secured for the modern civil society by means of the press.

How about present-day public opinion? It is sustained by the great public, whose sole sure magnitude is quantitative. Influenced by publicity through image and sound, it nevertheless has at its disposal many statements of opinion and diminishes its energy without losing it. Precisely in this sense it is also mass as the aleatory element. The consequence of this is the present-day, perhaps temporary, ambiguity of public opinion emerging from this context.

1. It opens up a pluralistic truth and politics-horizon, but it can also turn into the “Bad Infinite” of an indeterminate opinion.

2. Public opinion contributes to a democratization in the measure in which knowledge as the best quality of power is ascribed to the people. However, it also arouses the levelling of the “last man”, estranged through consumption and politically paralysed in resistance.

3. Public opinion is conditioned by the technology of communications. The print and its products – books and the press – were decisive for it in the Modern age. Today, what is decisive is the electromagnetic neotechnology, that is, radio, films, and particularly television. The technology of communications gives the basis for expecting new forms of participation and responsibility. On the other hand, it also has at its disposal means which threaten with the manipulation and massage of feeling, behaviour and consciousness.

4. Respect for public opinion is implicitly the acknowledgement of the other, of every other, in the praxis of public dialogue, of argumentation submitting to the best argument (as Apel contends), of the research of consensus and regard for dissent (Apel, Habermas). Its shadow is the dreadful amount of manifestations which have originated through the outbreak of manipulated feelings.

5. This public dialogue entails the demand for translation processes between different cultures, and also between closed languages of specialists and public communication language. On the other hand, one is also inclined to exaggerate the pragmatic function of language (its utility value in communication) and to neglect the creation of meaning.

6. As representative of the “sound human understanding,” public opinion influences the social world by means of the diagnosis of real needs, of ethical-political problems concerning justice and its foundations, and of the true genuine trends of reality. But it can also suffocate with an interpretation of reality attached to needs and want. Or one becomes fascinated with the

models of success nearly always proceeding from abundance societies.

7. Public opinion can also result in public catharsis, and so turn into a “therapeutic” and “educational means.” Nevertheless, it implies no reflexive distantiation and hence can contribute to the postmodern schizophrasia. The latter is characterized by Baudrillard as an exaggerated nearness to the world, a nearness from which not even our own lived body can protect us.

8. By public opinion human beings are consecrated to the role of citizens, that is to say, they become universal individuals in the always possible mediation between civil society and the state. On the other hand, it can also place both more strongly apart, when civil society turns into a consumer and acclamatory mass, and the state becomes cybernetic and technocratic.²⁷

Finally, thought can bring forth some questions for consideration in the future. Among them are the following: Do mass media form, deform or transform public opinion? Do they awake or hypnotize public opinion? Do they contain “hidden persuaders”? Which are the “new” myths condensing our deeper desires and wishes? Do we face, as Habermas believes, a new colonization of the life-world? What will prevail with the transformation of the masses into customers: public opinion or public market, “shopping” or educational institution?

Notes

¹ See María Gabriela Rebok, ‘Civilización planetaria y culturas peculiares: un vínculo bajo la amenaza de los neoconflictos.’ In *Escritos de Filosofía* 19–20 (Buenos Aires, 1987–88): 39–47.

² Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, ⁶1952), p. 149.

³ See G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, ²1975), III, 2, chap. 3.

⁴ See Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et récit* (Paris: Du Seuil, 1985), vol. III, pp. 355–359; *Soi-même comme un autre* (Paris: Du Seuil, 1990), pp. 167–198.

⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *Logik*, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, vol. I, p. 9.

⁶ Sigmund Freud, *El yo y el ello*, en *Obras Completas*, ed. J. Strachey y A. Freud, trans. J. L. Etcheverry (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu), vol. XIX.

⁷ See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, p. 314.

⁸ See S. Freud, *De guerra y muerte*, *Temas de actualidad*, in *OC*, IV, p. 284.

⁹ See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, p. 314.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹¹ See A. A. Kroeber and G. Kluckhohn, *Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Vintage Books, 1952).

¹² See Kostas Axelos, *El pensamiento planetario*, trans. S. Thenon and S. Lida (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1969); and *Introducción al pensar futuro*, trans. E. Albizu (Buenos Aires, Amorrortu, 1973).

¹³ See Martin Heidegger, 'Überwindung der Metaphysik,' in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Tübingen: Neske, ³1967), I, p. 79; *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, ⁴1957), p. 27.

¹⁴ Rainer Maria Rilke, 'Die Sonette an Orpheus,' in *Sämtliche Werke* (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1955), O, XIX, p. 743.

¹⁵ See Bernhard Waldenfels, 'Lo propio y lo extraño,' in *Estudios de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, 1995), vol. 13, p. 177. See also Dieter Lohmar, 'La experiencia de lo extraño,' in *Escritos de Filosofía* 29–30 (Buenos Aires: 1996).

¹⁶ See Pietro Prini, *Il cristinano e il potere, Essere per il futuro* (Roma: Studium, 1993), p. 53 ff.

¹⁷ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Bern/München: Francke, ⁵1966), p. 303.

¹⁸ G.W.F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, ⁷1975), p. 402.

¹⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 405–407. See also *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, ⁴1967), p. 165 ff.

²⁰ See G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien*, pp. 201 f., 239, 261 f.

²¹ See Dominique Wolton, *Elogio del gran público*, trans. A. Bixio (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992), p. 130.

²² See Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, ¹⁷1990), p. 244 f.

²³ See Jean Baudrillard, *Cultura y simulacro*, trans. A. Vicens and P. Rovira (Barcelona: Kairós, ²1984), p. 141 f.

²⁴ Gianni Vattimo, *La sociedad transparente*, trans. T. Oñate (Barcelona: Paidós, 1990), p. 81 f.

²⁵ See Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*.

²⁶ See Juan Carlos Scannone, 'Begegnungen der Kulturen,' in *Theologie and Philosophie* 66/3 (Freiburg-Basel-Wien: 1991): 375.

²⁷ See María Gabriela Rebok, 'La opinión pública en la sociedad de masas,' in *Anales de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias* (Buenos Aires: 1992), vol. XXVI (1), p. 101 f.